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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS-QUASI IN REM
JURISDICTION-FOREIGN ATTACHMENT-The Third Circuit Court of

Appeals has held the Pennsylvania foreign attachment statute violative of fourteenth amendment procedural due process and has
established minimum standards for a constitutional statute.
Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1976).
In 1973, Pennsylvania resident Elmer J. Jonnet commenced an
assumpsit action in the District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania against Dollar Savings Bank of the City of New York,
a New York corporation having its principal place of business in
that state.' Plaintiffs alleged the defendant had refused to honor a
$1,100,000 mortgage commitment! Because jurisdiction could not
be obtained under the Pennsylvania "long-arm" statute,3 Jonnet
utilized the state's foreign attachment procedure and attached
debts owed the defendant by two local corporations.' The statute
permitted attachment without prior notice or hearing, did not mandate the filing of an affidavit or bond by the plaintiff, and did not
require judicial supervision of the proceeding. 5
Dollar Savings Bank challenged the foreign attachment procedure on due process grounds. Granting defendant's motion to dismiss the action, the district court held the Pennsylvania statute
violated the fourteenth amendment by allowing the deprivation of
property without due process of law. Plaintiffs appealed the dis1. The action was brought by Jonnet and two Pennsylvania corporations. Jonnet v. Dollar
Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1125 (3d Cir. 1976). Federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of
citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
2. 530 F.2d at 1125.
3. Section 8309(c) of the Pennsylvania "long-arm" statute, PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit.
42, §§ 8301-10 (Supp. 1976), excludes mortgages from those transactions which constitute
"doing business" in Pennsylvania.
4. Foreign attachment constituted the only basis for jurisdiction. 530 F.2d at 1125 n.4.
FED. R. Civ. P. 64 authorizes the use of the state procedure by the federal district court.
5. The Pennsylvania foreign attachment procedure allowed the prothonotary (clerk of
court) to issue the writ of attachment without the participation of a judge. The plaintiff was
not required to state the basis of his claim or to post a bond; a complaint could be filed after
the attachment was effected. While the defendant could reduce the amount attached, the
attachment could be dissolved only by posting a bond; the entrance of a general appearance
did not dissolve the attachment. PA. R. Civ. P. 1251-79. These provisions were declared
unconstitutional by the Third Circuit. 530 F.2d at 1129-30.
6. Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 392 F. Supp. 1385 (W.D. Pa. 1975). The district court
based its decision on the tripartite test established by the Supreme Court in Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). For a discussion of the district court's analysis see note 33 infra.
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missal of the suit to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals which unanimously affirmed the lower court's ruling.7
Only four years earlier the Third Circuit had upheld the same
Pennsylvania foreign attachment statute in Lebowitz v. Forbes
Leasing and Finance Corp.' After Lebowitz, however, the United
States Supreme Court handed down three decisions expanding defendants' rights in attachment cases: Fuentes v. Shevin,5 Mitchell
v. W T. Grant Co.'0 and North Georgia Finishing,Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc." Although none of these cases dealt specifically with a factual
situation similar to that presented in Jonnet, in the Third Circuit's
view, "their implications for foreign attachment cannot be
ignored"; 2 the court stressed the refined notions of procedural due
process found in these cases and concluded that the Pennsylvania
foreign attachment procedure offered insufficient protection of the
3
defendant's property interest.
Moreover, in light of the dynamic concept of due process, the
court questioned the continuing viability of the 1921 Supreme Court
decision of Ownbey v. Morgan 4 as precedent mandating the validity
of the Pennsylvania procedure." Ownbey involved a foreign attach7. One concurring opinion was filed by Judge Gibbons. 530 F.2d at 1130. See notes 28-31
and accompanying text infra.
8. 456 F.2d 979 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972). In Lebowitz the Third Circuit
found no precedent which required the invalidation of the Pennsylvania statute. While recognizing the hardships worked on the defendant, the court evaluated the procedure in terms of
whether it "critically impaired the efficiency of the adversary system," and determined that
it did not. Id. at 981. Lebowitz was decided approximately four months before the Supreme
Court's decision in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
9. 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (striking down Pennsylvania and Florida replevin statutes which
failed to provide pre-seizure notice and hearing for debtor). See notes 32 & 33 and accompanying text infra.
10. 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (upholding Louisiana attachment statute which provided for
judicial participation in issuance of writ, an immediate post-seizure hearing, and award of
damages to defendant in event of wrongful attachment). See notes 34-36 and accompanying
text infra.
11. 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (invalidating Georgia garnishment statute which failed to provide
either prior or subsequent hearing, judicial supervision of the process or means of indemnifying defendant). See notes 37-41 and accompanying text infra.
12. 530 F.2d at 1127.
13. Id. at 1129-30.
14. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
15. 530 F.2d at 1128. Aside from Ownbey there is little precedent regarding procedural
safeguards in the context of foreign attachment. No circuit court of appeals has addressed
the issue since the line of procedural due process cases beginning with Sniadach v. Family
Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (requiring prior notice and hearing for pre-judgment garnishment of wages). District courts which have considered the question have reached conflicting
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ment statute similar to Pennsylvania's in its lack of procedural
safeguards.'" Although the Ownbey defendant had challenged only
one provision of the statute, the Supreme Court in dictum' 7 had
sanctioned the entire procedure, and recently cited Ownbey in
Fuentes and Mitchell.8 After considering these citations, the Third
Circuit determined that the Supreme Court would not require prior
notice and hearing for a valid foreign attachment; 9 the court reasoned, however, that the citations of Ownbey in Fuentes and
Mitchell did not constitute Supreme Court approval of the lack of
other procedural safeguards in the Ownbey statute. 0 The court of
appeals, therefore, outlined five essential safeguards drawn from its
interpretation of Mitchell and Di-Chem. 1 A valid foreign attachment statute would require: the filing of an affidavit specifically
results. See, e.g., In re Law Research Servs., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (Connecticut foreign attachment statute unconstitutional because of state's failure to exercise strict
control over attachment); Long v. Levinson, 374 F. Supp. 615 (S.D. Iowa 1974) (Iowa statute
upheld on basis of strict control exercised by state over proceeding); U.S. Indus. Inc. v. Gregg,
348 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Del. 1972) (upholding Delaware statute). These cases were decided on
the basis of the three-part test established in Fuentes. See note 33 infra.
16. The Delaware foreign attachment statute provided for the issuance of a writ by the
prothonotary upon the plaintiff's filing of an affidavit stipulating that the defendant resided
out of state and was justly indebted to plaintiff in a sum exceeding fifty dollars. See 256 U.S.
at 101-03 n.1. The plaintiff could actually gain control over the defendant's property prior to
any hearing by posting a bond which would compensate defendant if he appeared in court
within one year from the date of distribution and disproved the claim. Id. The Delaware
foreign attachment provisions may now be found at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § § 3506-08 (1975).
17. The defendant in Ownbey only challenged the provision which prevented a nonresident defendant from entering an appearance and defending the suit without posting a
special bond. 256 U.S. at 102-03. Because of this limited challenge, the Court was not required
to consider the statute as a whole. The Court emphasized, however, that such statutes trace
their history from English law. It concluded that such a longstanding custom could not be
considered violative of due process. Id. at 104-11. Delaware's statutory provision challenged
in Ownbey has been "long-since abandoned." 530 F.2d at 1136 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
18. See notes 42 & 43 and accompanying text infra.
19. 530 F.2d at 1128. See notes 45-49 and accompanying text infra.
20. Id. at 1129. For support of the Third Circuit's position that Ownbey should be read
narrowly see In re Law Research Servs., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 749, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(precedential value of Ownbey limited by fact that constitutionality of jurisdiction obtained
by attachment was not challenged). See also Hansford, ProceduralDue Processin the DebtorCreditor Relationship: The Impact of Di-Chem, 9 GA. L. REv. 589, 595 n.26 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Hansford]; Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process
Requirements, 82 YALE L.J. 1023, 1029-32 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Due Process
Requirements].
21. 530 F.2d at 1129-30. Although neither Mitchell nor Di-Chem set forth mandatory
procedural standards, the Supreme Court did consider the effect of the safeguards which were
present or lacking in the statutes involved. See notes 35 & 38 and accompanying text infra.
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setting forth the basis of the claim;"2 the presentment of the affidavit to an official with "legal competence";2 3 a means of indemnifying
the defendant;" an immediate post-seizure hearing;" and a method
of dissolving the attachment.2" Due process did not require that
notice and hearing precede foreign attachment, provided these
"other safeguards" are present; because the Pennsylvania statute
lacked such protections the court held it unconstitutional. 7
Although he concurred in this analysis, Judge Gibbons based his
separate opinion on the view that any foreign attachment procedure
would be unconstitutional under the facts presented in Jonnet.5
The concurring judge thought the "minimum contacts" required for
5
in personam jurisdiction by InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington"
should also be required for quasi in rem jurisdiction obtained by
foreign attachment.3 1 Since the defendant in Jonnet did not have
the requisite minimum contacts with Pennsylvania, Judge Gibbons
felt that foreign attachment could not be constitutionally utilized. 3
22. According to the Third Circuit, the affidavit must set forth the amount and the basis
of the claim, establish the non-residency of the defendant, and specify the property located
within the forum. 530 F.2d at 1129. In contrast, the Pennsylvania statute required only a
praecipe stating the property to be seized. PA. R. Civ. P. 1255.
23. 530 F.2d at 1130. While the court admitted that participation by the judiciary in the
issuance of the writ would afford greater protection to a defendant, it felt the states should
be permitted to implement an alternative procedure. Id. at 1129-30 & n.15. See notes 50-55
and accompanying text infra.
24. The court suggested that the plaintiff might be required to post a bond to indemnify
the defendant. 530 F.2d at 1130.
25. The court interpreted Mitchell and Di-Chem to require an early hearing on the validity of the attachment, but not necessarily an early trial on the merits of the suit. At the
hearing the plaintiff would have to show the probable validity of his claim and the defendant's non-residency if that were in issue. Id.
26. The court did not mandate a specific procedure for dissolution but indicated that
possible alternatives might include the posting of a bond or dissolution by entrance of a
general appearance. 530 F.2d at 1130.
27. Id. at 1129-30.
28. Id. at 1142. (Gibbons, J., concurring).
29. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In International Shoe the Supreme Court upheld Washington
state's right to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in an action
concerning the collection of the state's unemployment tax. The Court indicated due process
requires that the defendant have sufficient contacts with the forum state so that maintenance
of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. at
316.
30. Judge Gibbons examined the evolving standards of due process exemplified by
International Shoe, Sniadach, Fuentes, Mitchell and Di-Chem. He determined that early
cases such as Ownbey, which approved quasi in rem jurisdiction solely on the basis of judicial
power over property located within the forum, were inconsistent with those standards. 530
F.2d at 1134-35. See note 17 supra.
31. 530 F.2d at 1131. The loan agreement between the parties was consummated in New
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The Third Circuit's recognition that procedural safeguards are
essential to a valid attachment is consistent with Mitchell and DiChem; yet under Jonnet's factual circumstances, the court's failure
to require a hearing prior to the attachment, or judicial participation in the issuance of the writ is significant. The importance of preseizure notice and hearing to fourteenth amendment due process
was emphasized by the Supreme Court in Fuentes, a decision which
struck down statutes permitting replevin of consumer goods without
notice or hearing for the installment buyer.2 Although title remained in the seller, giving him a secured interest, the Court in
Fuentes concluded that pre-seizure notice and hearing would be
required for a valid replevin except in extraordinary situations.3
The Court's broad ruling in Fuentes was subsequently narrowed in
Mitchell,31 another installment purchase case where the creditor
retained a secured interest. There the Court upheld a statute which
York and there was no evidence the defendant had conducted any business in Pennsylvania.
Judge Gibbons found that it would violate the notions of fundamental fairness articulated in
InternationalShoe to require the defendant to either defend in a state with which it had no
contacts or lose its property by default. Furthermore, even if the defendant's contacts with
the state were substantial, the attachment procedure would violate equal protection, since
Pennsylvania does not permit prejudgment attachment of a resident defendant's assets. Id.
at 1141-43. See note 56 infra.
32. Fuentes stressed that all kinds of property interests should be protected by prior notice
and hearing. 407 U.S. at 89-90. In contrast, in its earlier decision in Lebowitz, the Third
Circuit had emphasized the difference between the attachment of wages, protected under
Sniadach, and the attachment of a corporate bank account, which did not require such
protection. 456 F.2d at 981. But see text accompanying notes 37-41 infra.
33. 407 U.S. at 90-91. The Court established a tripartite test for determining when such
an "extraordinary situation" existed. First, the seizure must be necessary to secure an important governmental or general public interest. Second, there must be a special need for prompt
action. Third, the state must exercise strict control over the procedure. Id. at 91.
The district court in Jonnet applied the Fuentes test and found the Pennsylvania statute
lacking in each category. Although it recognized the state's legitimate interest in obtaining
jurisdiction, the court ruled that the statute was overbroad because it did not distinguish
between defendants over whom jurisdiction could be obtained solely by attachment, and
those susceptible to the Pennsylvania "long-arm" statute. The court found no need for
prompt action since the disposal of long term mortgages would not be simple. Finally, the
requisite strict state control over the procedure was determined to be totally absent. 392 F.
Supp. at 1392. Although the Third Circuit utilized Mitchell's balancing approach rather than
the Fuentes test, it indicated the result would be the same under the facts in Jonnet. 530
F.2d at 1129 n.13. Compare Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 607-10 (1974), with
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-91 (1972).
34. The effect of Mitchell on the notice and hearing requirement established by Fuentes
was not certain. 530 F.2d at 1126-27. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 629 (1974)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Mitchell overruled Fuentes); Turner v. Impala
Motors, 503 F.2d 607, 610 (6th Cir. 1974) (assuming Fuentes had been overruled by Mitchell).
See generally 14 DuQ. L. REv. 494, 503 & n.62 (1976).
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provided for an immediate post-seizure hearing and other safeguards, including judicial participation in the issuance of the writ,
posting of a bond by the plaintiff, and the awarding of damages to
the defendant if the plaintiff did not prove probable cause for his
claim at the hearing. 5 In Mitchell the Court emphasized the seller's
interest in preventing the removal, transfer or destruction of his
goods; when this interest was weighed against the buyer's interest
in receiving a prior hearing, the Court concluded that a hearing
immediately following the seizure, combined with the other safeguards built into the statute, adequately protected both parties'
interests and complied with fourteenth amendment due process re36
quirements.
The Supreme Court's approval of post-seizure hearings in
Mitchell was extended by its decision in Di-Chem. The corporate
plaintiff, alleging the defendant was indebted to it, had been permitted to effect a pre-judgment garnishment of the defendant's corporate bank account in which the plaintiff had no property interest.3 71 Because the Georgia statute utilized by the plaintiff failed to
provide the safeguards found in the Mitchell statute, the Court
ruled it was inadequate.3 Yet even after citing Fuentes as precedent, the Court did not require a prior hearing in Di-Chem; it intimated only that an early one was necessary. 3 More importantly, in
Di-Chem the Court did not discuss the plaintiff's lack of a property
interest in the assets attached. In Mitchell the Court had emphasized that in the case of a secured transaction, the issues can be
easily established by documentary proof such as a lien agreement,
reducing the need for an adversary hearing prior to the attach35. 416 U.S. at 605-07. The Louisiana statute also required an affidavit specifically setting
forth the claim, and provided that even if the plaintiff proved probable cause at the postseizure hearing, the defendant could secure possession of the goods by posting a bond. Id.
36. Id. at 607-10.
37. 419 U.S. at 604. Although Di-Chem also involved a sale of goods to the defendant,
the seller apparently did not retain title to the goods and was interested in payment rather
than repossession.
38. The Georgia attachment statute required only the filing of a conclusory affidavit and
did not provide for judicial supervision in the issuing of the writ. There was no provision for
an early post-seizure hearing; the garnishment could be dissolved only by posting a bond. Id.
at 608.
39. 419 U.S. at 607. Although the Court cited both Fuentes and Mitchell in support of its
decision, the opinion failed to set forth the actual basis for the holding. In his dissenting
opinion, Justice Blackmun stated: "One gains the impression, particularly from the final
paragraph of its opinion, that the Court is endeavoring to say as little as possible in explaining
just why the Supreme Court of Georgia is being reversed." Id. at 614.
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ment.' Its failure to make any factual distinction between the seizure of secured property in Mitchell, and the attachment of a bank
account for an unrelated debt in Di-Chem, suggests that a prehearing attachment in the context of unsecured transactions would
be acceptable to the Supreme Court."
The Third Circuit's refusal to require prior notice and hearing for
a foreign attachment may therefore be consistent with Di-Chem's
apparent extension of Mitchell to situations where no lien exists.
Rather than directly acknowledge the issues raised by the existence
or lack of a property interest in the plaintiff, however, the court of
appeals alluded to the Supreme Court's recent references to
Ownbey. 2 In Fuentes, Ownbey was cited as an extraordinary situation justifying pre-hearing seizure because of the state's interest in
obtaining jurisdiction. 3 A requirement of notice and hearing prior
to a foreign attachment could arguably subvert the state's legitimate interest since the defendant might remove his assets from the
forum, thus destroying the basis for jurisdiction."
40. 416 U.S. at 617-18.
41. It has been suggested that this aspect of Di-Chem represents a more substantial
departure from Fuentes than Mitchell represented. See Hansford, supra note 20, at 605-09.
For the view that the due process requirements established in Sniadach and Fuentes should
continue to apply to unsecured transactions despite Di-Chem see Catz & Robinson, Due
Processand Creditor'sRemedies: From Sniadach and Fuentes to Mitchell, North Georgiaand
Beyond, 28 RuT. L. REv. 541, 566 (1975).
42. The Supreme Court first cited Ownbey in the Sniadach decision as illustrative of a
situation in which pre-hearing seizure may be permissible. 395 U.S. at 339. In Fuentes,
Ownbey was used as an example of an extraordinary situation justifying pre-hearing seizure.
407 U.S. at 91 n.23. Ownbey was cited in Mitchell in support of the proposition that due
process is satisfied if the defendant is afforded a hearing at some point, whether prior or
subsequent to the attachment. 416 U.S. at 613.
The extent of the Supreme Court's approval of Ownbey is unclear. Supreme Court citations
to Ownbey may indicate only that foreign attachment was necessary to secure jurisdiction in
1915, when that action arose, rather than constituting recognition that attachment is still
necessary today in view of "long-arm" jurisdiction. See Due Process Requirements, supra
note 20, at 1029-32. Two alternative explanations are also possible: either the Court is unwilling to overrule a long-standing precedent, or the citations are indicative of a different approach to various pre-hearing seizure procedures. See Hansford, supra note 20, at 595 n.23.
43. See note 33 supra.
44. In Lebowitz the Third Circuit acknowledged that prior notice to a non-resident defendant would afford him the opportunity to remove his assets and avoid the jurisdiction of the
court. 456 F.2d at 981. See also Merrill Lynch Gov't Sec., Inc. v. Fidelity Mut. Sav. Bank,
396 F. Supp. 318, 320-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (upholding the New York foreign attachment
statute based on this aspect of Lebowitz). However, in his concurring opinion in Jonnet,
Judge Gibbons argued that this assumption does not justify different treatment for resident
and non-resident defendants. 530 F.2d at 1142-43.
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Although the Third Circuit's rationale in Jonnet is supported by
Supreme Court precedent, the court could have applied other reasoning consistent with that precedent to reach a different result. In
Guzman v. Western State Bank," the Eighth Circuit required a
hearing prior to any taking of property absent an assertion by the
creditor that the defendant is likely to conceal, dispose of, or destroy
the particular property." The plaintiff in Guzman had a property
interest in the goods attached; such a hearing requirement seems
even more appropriate in the case of foreign attachment where the
attachment is effected not to safeguard a creditor's property, but
only to obtain jurisdiction.47 Since Mitchell and Di-Chem set forth
minimum rather than maximum due process standards, 8 the Third
Circuit might have included a requirement similar to that pronounced in Guzman. In the absence of evidence that the nonresident defendant is likely to remove his assets from the forum, a
provision for pre-seizure notice and hearing would better accomodate the competing interests at stake-the state's interest in obtaining jurisdiction would not be jeopardized and a hearing prior to the
attachment of the defendant's property would ensure the fundamental fairness contemplated by procedural due process.49
The Third Circuit also failed to require the participation of a
judge in the issuance of the writ of attachment. While it conceded
that Mitchell and Di-Chem "might be read to require that a judge
approve the seizure,""0 the court required only the participation of
45. 516 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1975) (mobile home and automobile attached under writ issued
by clerk of court without prior notice or hearing).
46. The court described attachment as a "drastic remedy" and observed that the creditor's interest normally will not be jeopardized by the delay involved in granting a prior
hearing. Id. at 130.
47. If an installment purchaser destroys or transfers the goods, they are lost to the creditor; if a non-resident removes his assets in order to avoid jurisdiction, an action may still be
brought in the jurisdiction where he is found. Cf. Zammit, Quasi-In-Rem Jurisdiction:Outmoded and Unconstitutional?, 49 ST. JOHN L. REv. 668, 681-82 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Zammit].
48. Both Mitchell and Di-Chem dealt only with the particular statutory provisions presented. In Mitchell the Court noted recent reports and proposals on the subject of creditor
remedies, but commented:
We indicate no view whatsoever on the desirability of one or more of the proposed
reforms. The uncertainty evident in the current debate suggests caution in the adoption of an inflexible constitutional rule.
416 U.S. at 618-19 n.13.
49. The Guzman court found that such a requirement most effectively balanced the
competing interests involved. 516 F.2d at 129-30.
50. 530 F.2d at 1130 n.15.
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a "competent" official."' Since neither Mitchell nor Di-Chem specified whether judicial participation in the issuance of the writ is
constitutionally required or merely a desirable safeguard,"2 the
court's reading of those decisions may be defensible. The vague
standard set forth in Jonnet may, however, require a case by case
determination of whether the issuing official has the requisite professional competence to issue the writ, and more importantly, it
offers little assurance against a wrongful taking. 3 In the area of
secured transactions, probable cause for an attachment may be
demonstrated by the production of the installment agreement and
evidence of default." Outside this area, however, the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a writ is a more complex question.
Documentary evidence may not suffice to show the existence and
breach of a contract or the commission of a tort; if the designated
official has insufficient knowledge of the law, the possibility is
greater that a defendant may be deprived of his property on the
basis of an invalid or insubstantial claim. Under this analysis, judicial participation in the issuance of the writ should be required in
order to safeguard the interests of the defendant. 5
Regardless of its shortcomings,56 the Jonnet decision represents a
51. Id. at 1130. See note 23 supra.
52. But see North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 611 n.3 (1975)
(Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell voiced his disagreement with the majority's
"suggestion that the Due Process Clause might require" judicial participation in the issuance
of the garnishment writ. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Upholding the statute in Mitchell, the Court emphasized that it protected the defendant against wrongful seizure of his property. 416 U.S. at 605.
54. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
55. The Eighth Circuit in Guzman required judicial participation in the issuance of the
writ not only to insure against a wrongful taking, but also to determine "whether the impact
on the debtor of even a temporary deprivation of the property outweighs the interest of the
creditor or the state in affording the creditor ex parte attachment." 516 F.2d at 131.
56. A troublesome question left unanswered by Jonnet is whether evolving notions of due
process require a defendant in a foreign attachment action to have "minimum contacts" with
the forum state. Although the question was not raised by the parties, the concurring opinion's
emphasis on this point suggests that a future defendant will pursue the issue.
Commentators have supported the position taken by Judge Gibbons that minimum contacts should be required for a valid foreign attachment. See, e.g., Carrington, The Modern
Utility of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction,76 HARv. L. REv. 303, 306-09 (1962); Hazard, A General
Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241, 281-88; Zammit, supra note 47,
at 674-77. See also Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 569 (1958) (state court applying minimum contacts doctrine to quasi in rem
jurisdiction). In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1950),
the Supreme Court indicated that the applicability of due process standards should not
depend on the classification of an action as in personam or quasi in rem.
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significant step in the area of procedural due process. Defendants
subject to foreign attachment in Pennsylvania are now assured of
greater protection against the fundamental unfairness which may
result from a state's desire to provide its citizens with a convenient
judicial forum. The guidelines set forth by the Third Circuit for a
future statute will guard the rights of both plaintiffs and defendants
and may provide an impetus for legislatures in other states to reconsider existing foreign attachment procedures and to enact statutes
more consistent with the concept of due process.
Jane Green Davis
When the issue is raised, the court will be required to consider not only the limitations
imposed by InternationalShoe, but also the impact of state "long-arm" statutes on both the
necessity and utility of foreign attachment. Additionally, it may have to determine if attachment may be justified on public policy grounds in certain situations where minimum contacts
with the forum state do not exist. The resolution of these questions will require a more
thorough evaluation of the legal and policy bases underlying foreign attachment.

